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Art, Research, and the Fine Arts PhD
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AbStrAct  In what follows I offer an anecdotal engagement with the Fine Arts PhD at a
moment when it is just emerging in North America. I argue that doctoral activities that cross
theory/practice lines, at their best, offer a unique opportunity to rethink what constitutes ac-
ademic knowledge production and assessment by necessitating that these lines be made
porous and responsive to each other.  This reconﬁguration, to the extent that it calls into ques-
tion both the subject and object of knowledge, is one that beneﬁts from the insights of femi-
nism in its “new materialist” incarnation.
KeywordS  Research-creation; New materialism; Feminism; Interdisciplinarity; Fine Arts
PhD; Anecdotal theory
réSumé  Dans ce qui suit, je m’engage de façon anecdotique avec le doctorat d’arts
plastiques au moment où ce dernier vient d’apparaître en Amérique du Nord. Je soutiens
que les activités du doctorat d’arts plastiques peuvent mettre en doute la distinction entre la
pratique et la théorie, et qu’elles offrent donc l’occasion de repenser ce qui constitue le savoir
et l’évaluation académique. Cette reconﬁguration de la pratique et la théorie, dans la mesure
où remet en cause à la fois le sujet et l’objet de la connaissance, s’appuie surtout sur le
féminisme et sur ce qu’on appelle le « nouveau féminisme matérialiste ».
motS cLéS  La recherche-création; Le nouveau matérialisme; Le féminisme; L’inter-
disciplinarité; Le doctorat és beaux arts; La théorie anecdotique
Anecdotal theorizing
Abstract, disembodied theory, theory in no place or time, 
dreams of being the last word; [in contrast] occasional, 
anecdotal theory, theory in the ﬂesh of practice, 
speaks with the desire for a response. 
—Gallop, 2002, p. 164 (emphasis added)
this article considers what is at stake in the current reconﬁguration of artistic andacademic labour in the united States and canada under the auspices of the Fine
Arts Phd.  this issue is of particular relevance given that, while they have long existed
in the uK, Scandinavia, and Australia, Fine Arts doctoral programs are only just now
emerging with any seriousness in North America. moreover, debates surrounding such
programs tackle important questions, such as: How can art-as-research, research-cre-
ation and artistic knowledge production inform how we understand the practices of
the humanities, the sciences and social sciences? what are the modes of practice and
engagement traditionally embedded within the discursive ﬁeld we call “art,” that, when
taken seriously, contribute to important re-conceptualizations of the North American
university system? (these re-conceptualizations include those surrounding the “digital
humanities” and problem-based knowledge production, as well as interdisciplinary
knowledge coalitions often branded under the banner of cross-departmental “synergy.”)
And why, other than institutional pressure, should we produce a Fine Arts Phd—a doc-
tor of philosophy—rather than the more traditionally practice-based designation of a
doctor of Visual Arts?  In other words, what is at stake in proposing artistic labour as a
branch of philosophic discourse? Linked to this, in the context of the humanities and
social sciences, what marks the limit of the Fine Arts Phd? where do the humanities,
sciences, and arts meet and clash around the issues of their language and utility? what
kinds of labour can be said to qualify for doctoral level assessment and what kinds of
labour cannot?  the following article ﬂeshes out some of the ways to navigate this ter-
ritory and the stakes that lay in the questions themselves, the ways we ask them, and
the provisional answers that we might propose. this will be done both anecdotally and
theoretically, drawing on feminism as a central rubric.
the role of the personal voice in feminist criticism—read in, but not reducible to,
the autobiographical, confessional, situated, motivated, interested, anecdotal, and per-
formative—is to assert a location and production of value tied to those material and
phantasm-like locations we call the “I” and the “me.” It is a voice that champions the
home as a location from which to speak, whether that home is understood as the pri-
vate and domestic, the personal and cathected, or the location of a political identity
(Loveless, 2010). In this article, I speak from my homes as a scholar, an artist, a teacher,
and a maker in order to explore the intersections of practice and theory in the context
of the Fine Arts Phd. In speaking politically, and diffractively, from my locations within
and without the academy, my voice echoes with a host of voices in feminist theory
and practice.1 I start, then, with feminism as a mode of attention, political commitment,
and theoretical engagement for emerging questions surrounding artistic knowledge
production. In attempting to ground this work in feminist theorypractice, I am indebted
to feminist psychoanalytic and literary theorist Jane Gallop (2002), in particularly her
“Anecdotal theory” from which my epigraph is taken.
the title, “Practice in the Flesh of theory,” inverts Gallop’s “theory in the ﬂesh of
practice.” It does this in part to signal that, while I am an ally in Gallop’s feminist project
of championing a “theorypractice” that is grounded and enmeshed in the everyday,
her alignment of “practice” and “the ﬂesh,” if taken at face value, re-enshrines a set of
binaries that I am concerned with questioning. Instead, I pair “theory” with “ﬂesh”
as a way of opening up the question of what we mean by each.2 while many of the de-
bates surrounding the Fine Arts Phd focus on how we might think of artistic praxis as
a mode of theory-making, in this article, it will be suggested that the other axis of this
relationship is equally important. If the notion of “theory,” broadly speaking, is not it-
self opened up and reconﬁgured, these debates threaten to rearticulate an inherited
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hierarchy in which the aim, for all practices, is to rise to the level of theoretical knowl-
edge production or “research.” I am arguing for the value of philosophically-based doc-
toral training for artists, while at the same time suggesting that such practices work
not only to reconﬁgure our artistic practices, but also to bring attention to theory-mak-
ing, itself, as a messy, ﬂeshy practice. In this, I draw on an understanding of the ﬂesh
posited in the work of phenomenologist, maurice merleau-Ponty.
the ﬂesh, for merleau-Ponty (1969), is meant to invoke both the ﬂeshiness of a
body and the deep web of materiality surrounding that body, of which that body is a
part (braidotti, 2001). Here, the constructed binarism in which “we” autonomously
inhabit “our bodies” and, from this location, act upon an external and often passive
world is challenged. Further, and paramount to this article, merleau-Ponty’s notion of
the ﬂesh addresses itself to those elements not commonly considered material:
thought and language. As Gary madison (1999) reminds us,
merleau-Ponty rejected the view that words are mere signs and that language
itself is essentially nothing more than semiotic code. … for merleau-Ponty
language was the very ﬂesh of what we call the ‘world.’ (p. 179, emphasis added).
this gloss on merleau-Ponty’s notion of the ﬂesh alludes to the importance of wresting
“language” away from the frameworks of a “purely” discursive turn and towards the
multiplicity of a transversal materialist perspective that challenges the binary split be-
tween “theory” and “practice.”3 Similarly, this article attempts to wrench “theory” from
its inherited alignment with a disembodied, abstract rigour that is somehow separate
from, yet applied to, “practice.” this is achieved here through the use of the compound
neologism theorypractice—on the model of donna Haraway’s (1997) groundbreaking
naturecultures —in order to hold together practice and theory in a way that reminds
us that the latter is, itself, a “making practice,” one that is embodied and aesthetic.
Gallop’s (2002) work on anecdotal theory offers one way into such a theorypractice
(Loveless, 2011). Anecdotal theory insists not only on pulling the taint of the explicitly
local, ﬂeshy, embodied, and personal into the formal realm of academic knowledge
formation, but also on an excavational practice through which we see that very “taint”
as always already embedded within the loftiest registers of the academy. In this way,
anecdotal theory opens theory-making up as a materialist category, which, given Gal-
lop’s inclinations, is grounded in the psychoanalytic notions of transference and
cathexis.
cathexis refers to a libidinal investment in a person, place, idea, or thing. Impor-
tantly, however, cathexis is never an investment in the economic sense of the word;
that is, the choice to invest is never, psychoanalytically speaking, a free choice. Instead,
cathexis is better thought of as a kind of force. one does not cathect an object, so much
as ﬁnd oneself knotted up in a cathected relay through which meaning, identity, and
value emerge. Anecdotal theory pulls one into the kind of relation implied by cathexis
by insisting that the locations that we theorize from are always grounded in what
moves us most deeply, in that which we are driven by and to which we are driven. In
acknowledging the importance of cathexis, anecdotal theory reconﬁgures modes of
accountability in theory making, as well as its very form. thus, the work of any anec-
dotal theory, including the experimental work of this article, is both a working with
and working through in which identity is at stake.4 this working through is not an
analysis in which answers are found; it is the work of an enmeshed and complex track-
ing of those situated webs we call “affect.” A grounding in anecdote is then understood
not as the return to the fullness of an “I,” but instead as the negotiation through the
relay of what Gallop might call “the ear of the other” (derrida, 1998), an ear that invites
dissent, debate, and friction.
An anecdotal accounting
this article is motivated in part by the question of where one might look to make
strong ethical choices as artistic, intellectual, social beings. Accordingly, I am led to
question what it means to answer or ask a question from “within” rather than from
“without”; what it means to assert an approach in which the cathected and the situated
are valued rather than disavowed. In this, what is at stake is the status of the subject-
object of knowledge: what gets to count as knowledge, where, when, and how? I turn,
then, to a story that has implications for a more broadly located ethics of pedagogical
practice: my personal experience in choosing a Phd program—one that cannot, in
any sense, be mistaken for a Fine Arts Phd—and in conﬁguring my labour as an artist,
in and along with my “traditional” Phd labour.
In short, my trajectory was as follows: in the ﬁrst year of my mFA (2001), I realized
that there were theoretical questions enmeshed with my material explorations that I
wanted to work with in ways that the program’s faculty were neither prepared nor
trained to accommodate. the kinds of art theory that circulated during my arts training
drew heavily on derrida, Lacan, Foucault, and their interlocutors; however, at the stu-
dio level, engagements with the terms “deconstruction,” “performativity,” “the other,”
et certa, were limited to a kind of art theory lingo that had little to do with the intellec-
tual commitments of the scholars who stood, emblematic and impervious, behind
these terms. Instead of the transmission of ideas in their process, their porousness,
their contextual care—that is, instead of an understanding of theory as a “making
practice”—the legitimating function of “art speak” circulated as a kind of super-egoic
task-master which one could bend to or resist. encounters were de facto instrumental-
ized within a commodity market towards which “art speak” was put to use, and in
which primacy was put on material skill within or between clearly deﬁned artistic
media. these are, of course, simpliﬁcations and generalizations, but for a speciﬁc pur-
pose: not to account for every faculty member and course I encountered during my
mFA but, rather, to account for the structure of the mFA and for the kind of labour it
is traditionally designed to support.
It was in this context that I petitioned my mFA institution to allow me to apply to
and complete an mA in contemporary art history, criticism, and theory at the same
time as my mFA, as well as petitioning what was to be my mA institution to accept my
application, even though I was already enrolled in a graduate program. this wasn’t
easy. After all, within the traditional organization of the North American university,
art history and studio programs are often located on opposite sides of campus. Fur-
thermore, within these programs the long fought-over lines between artist, curator,
historian, critic, and theorist are often drawn in such a way as to limit the kinds of
works that are possible. even if housed together, however, participants in these pro-
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grams are generally trained not only not to comprehend the language and value of
each other’s approaches, but also to have competing hierarchies of value based on
these differences. during my training, I regularly encountered this dynamic as some
form of practice/theory divide in which theorists were given the “explanatory gloves
of gold” and practitioners the “idiot-savant access to genius,” to the detriment of both.
After convincing both institutions that this move was essential for my work, I pur-
sued both the mFA and mA simultaneously. If I had been doing this today, I might
have gone directly into a Fine Arts Phd, but as there were, to my knowledge, no such
programs in North America at that time, I completed my two masters and then entered
a program that can in no way be mistaken for practice-led, practice-based program,
organized around research-creation practices. Indeed, the program I attended is known
as a bastion of “high theory,” and, as such, has historically rejected any practice other
than the book-length dissertation as a legitimate ﬁnal product of doctoral labour. this
was nonetheless the most interesting choice for me intellectually, politically, and per-
sonally. It was the ﬁrst non-disciplinary humanities doctoral program in North Amer-
ica, it created the ﬁrst ofﬁcial position within feminist theory in the united States, and
it encouraged doctoral work that was “problem-based,” a self-driven and self-legiti-
mating practice familiar to me from my interdisciplinary mFA labour.
In hindsight, it is clear to me that learning the practice—the medium—of the book-
length dissertation has been invaluable, and it is one of the forms of making that I plan
to engage in for the rest of my life. the book, as any academic can attest, is a fascinating
medium and a gratifying, if infuriating, labour practice with its own set of mutable con-
ventions. while normative in the humanities, however, it is only one form of practice.
And, as with all media, the book lends itself more gracefully to the exploration of some
ideas than others, a fact that alternative dissertating practices, such as digital disserta-
tions, insist we confront.5 It is in the space between this encounter with the book and
the speciﬁc way that I approached my Phd theory-making, alongside the artistic and
curatorial practices that I was engaged in, that I began to think about debates surround-
ing the Fine Arts Phd, curious about the ways that it asks us to reconﬁgure interdisci-
plinary pedagogy in a way that neither eschews disciplinary dedication and speciﬁcity,
nor simply creates a new norm of practice, a new to jettison the old.
In considering these debates, I was not interested in the imperative to jump on a
degree inﬂation bandwagon as a way to get access to greater funds for students who,
rather than engaging in a differently inﬂected branch of inquiry, would simply produce
an expanded version of mFA labour—that is, an mFA show complemented by an ex-
planatory thesis, a common practice with distinct subject and object lines. while I
have a full understanding of the need for funding in the arts and of the value of the
label “research” for acquiring such funds, what primarily interested me in these de-
bates was to see the political and intellectual commitments of project-based or ques-
tion-driven knowledge production extend beyond the comfortable frames of a now
common interdisciplinary axis. when one speaks of conventional interdisciplinary
practice, this generally means two disciplinary frameworks being brought together
that inhabit the same general school or division of knowledge, such as video and per-
formance in the arts, or anthropology and history in the humanities. often, in this
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strictly interdisciplinary model, moderate differences are brought together to create a
new comprehensibility. I came instead to think about my doctoral practices in terms
more closely linked to what rosi braidotti (1994; 2002) would call “nomadology”: a
multiplicity of responsive practices that demand situated accountability rather than
allegiance to discipline. If a discipline can be said to be constituted by what it excludes,
and inter-disciplines by how they couple the central concerns of two or more discipli-
nary practices, then what I am arguing for is something different. though interdisci-
plinary pedagogy can and has been read as a situation that demands a set of “depth”
analyses from within discretely articulated disciplines that are then brought together,
it can also be read as a structural dislocation of ﬁxed loci of knowledge in favour of a
situated imperative that engages in both a responsive and “response-able” dialogue
between sources, inspirations, discourses, and stakes (coles & derfert; Klein, 2001;
moran, 2002).
In this context, it is worth noting art historian James elkins’ 2009 “Artists with
Phds: on the New doctoral degree in Studio Art,” the ﬁrst book on this topic directly
addressing a North American context. For elkins, one of the central threats of a Fine
Arts Phd is identitarian:
[by] turning artists into scholars, and requiring that they produce impossible
amounts of writing (p. vii) … art as a whole may become even more academic
and intellectual—more involved with theory, possibly even more alienated
from skill and technique. (p. x) 
Attached to this concern is the question of disciplinary speciﬁcity and sanctity: 
[the Fine Arts Phd] makes art into a hothouse ﬂower. It makes it into philos-
ophy, or literary criticism (p. vii). … these new programs deserve better: they
deserve a language that is at once full, capacious, accurate, and not borrowed
from other disciplines. … [these appropriated theories] may be widely useful,
but [they] will not provide the indigenous accounting that is required, accord-
ing to the logic of the university, of every ﬁeld.  (elkins, 2009, p. xi, emphasis
added)
Assertions like this bring to mind experiments such as Lucien clergue’s 1979 doc-
toral dissertation, Langage des Sables, produced under the direction of roland barthes
entirely in the medium of photography (rowe, 1995)6. while something like Langage
des Sables —a Phd that didn’t have a single word in it—might be what elkins has in
mind in calling for “indigenous” Phd practices for the arts, and while I am, admittedly,
interested in gestures such as this and the challenge that they propose to doctoral level
assessment, I want to respectfully disagree with what I read as elkins’ fundamentally
disciplinary approach. rather than artistic identity and indigeneity, the Fine Arts Phd,
at its most interesting, serves doctoral level work that experiments with inherited for-
mal constraints and challenges the lines delineating legitimate disciplinary labour. In
this way the Fine Arts Phd contributes to new thinking in inter- and non-disciplinary
pedagogy by insisting that we ask ourselves what gets to count as legitimate knowledge
production, where, when, and how (a challenge, to my mind, that marks it as a deeply
feminist project).
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while this seems clear to me now, it is debates, such as the one above, that I
struggled with, in my move from mA/mFA to Phd. to begin with, I found myself
insisting that, as in the work I produced for my mA and mFA, the writing practices
of my Phd and my ongoing commitment to artistic practice were distinct. the
importance of this lay in my having been trained in a model of knowledge pro-
duction in which philosophy takes charge of and frames art, a hierarchy of knowl-
edge endemic to the North American university structure.7  what I wanted to
resist, above all, was an illustrative framework in which my dissertation explained,
justified, or described my artistic practice, or conversely, an artistic practice that
translated my theoretical research into artistic form. It was crucial to me that the
relationship between the two—my proposed manuscript and my artistic prac-
tice—not be programmatic. I didn’t want either to become, in any simple sense,
the object of the other.
my insistence notwithstanding, by the end of my Phd qualifying process, I found
that the practices that I wanted to keep apart were entangling themselves in new ways,
and around new questions. I realized that it was precisely an approach that refused
the book form as artistic medium, and the dissertation as artistic genre, that was keep-
ing the seeming binary of appropriated artist-object, or explanatory theorist-subject,
in place. In considering these disciplinary variances as differences of medium—both
plastic, both theoretical—the questions became: which medium or form does this ex-
ploration want to take? How does it want to be molded? Viewed? contemplated?8
to offer one example of how my practices and theories were entangling them-
selves in each other, in 2009 I was invited to produce a conversation-based wall draw-
ing at the Kentler International drawing Space in New york, which I called “Short
Statements on Artistic Knowledge Production.” For this project, I invited twenty-ﬁve
international artists and theorists to send me a statement and instructional perform-
ance action on the topic of “the Artist’s Knowledge.” I performed each of these actions
in the gallery space, videotaping them with an iPhone attached to my body. with each
performance-action I became a pawn in a debate staged between different approaches
to the topic and different modes of attention and action, some slow, some quick; some
humourous, some contemplative; some painful, some fun. upon completion, I traced
the marks left by the actions on the gallery walls in Silverpoint and made a small hole
at each point two lines intersected, creating an intricate process-based document mark-
ing the event of each action. Finally, during the exhibition, a book was made available
with the collected statements and actions. this, along with a dVd loop of the perform-
ances themselves, invited viewers to consider the question of artistic knowledge pro-
duction in an open-ended fashion; to read, watch, linger, and meditate on the delicate
traces, making archeological links between the statements, actions, and the visual ﬁeld
left behind.
Practically speaking, this project informed the work of my written dissertation by
pushing at the limits of traditional pedagogy, challenging its inherited linearity and re-
placing it with material and rhizomatic investigation.9 It was, however, just one of
many such explorations, and though some of the artistic projects I worked on during
my Phd found their way into the dissertation as anecdotes, this one did not.  Instead,
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it stands here as an example of one of the practices I engaged in as a way of inhabiting
and making porous the theoretical world of a dissertation on the question of pedagogy:
how we come to know, how we come to learn, and how what we come to know and
learn comes to matter.
As I progressed in my Phd labour, what I realized was that attention to pedagogy
as daily practice—as an articulating force of the social, political, and aesthetic—was
not only central to my artistic and academic projects, but also, in hindsight, the logical
extension of both my mA and my mFA work. Instead of ﬁnding myself doing a theo-
retical dissertation on a completely separate topic, I found myself, over the course of
my six years of doctoral labour, on the very same path, only working in different
media.  Although I had fully intended my projects to remain distinct, the deeper I in-
habited each of them, the closer they became. I say this not to subscribe to the popular
ﬁgure of artistic and academic coherence and identity, but to invoke something less
rational and recognizable—something closer to the level of the psychoanalytic drive.
while writing my dissertation, this drive lured me responsively between practices:
extensive periods spent with books, alternating with extensive periods spent at
performance festivals or residencies, which, in turn, alternated with extensive pe-
riods spent ensconced in writing and in conversation. It was through navigating
the different modes of attention, literacies, cannons, and voices demanded by
each of these practices that I developed my ideas about the pedagogical both as
cathected space and material practice. by negotiating the, often uncomfortable,
differences between these practices, I discovered the importance of speaking with
difference and dissent.
molded in and with conversation, and in and with performance, in the end my
dissertation performed a sort of writing marked by multi-vocal and multimodal regis-
ters, by shifting in and out of variously coded vocalities, literacies and disciplininary
methodologies.  while inhabiting the strictures of social convention—i.e., what counts
as legitimate (writing) behaviour, where, when and how, versus what is too personal,
where, when, and why—I worked to bring attention to something between what 
Haraway (2004, 2010) calls the “worlding” and deleuze and Guattari (1987) call the
“hacceities” constitutive of each disciplinary practice. In this respect, my doctoral
labour—both artistic and academic—was deeply indebted to the feminist new mate-
rialist perspective.
New materialism—a term attributed by some to rosi braidotti and by others to
manuel de Landa—is organized around a central presupposition: that our world is
not divided into the inert and the active; instead, it is made up of “various materialities
constantly engaged in a network of relations” (bennett, 2004, p. 354). It is worth noting
that the “new” in “new materialism” is contentious. many of those who are associated
with the term have been around for a long time and might argue that there is nothing
“new,” in any progressive sense, happening here (for instance, rosi braidotti, donna
Haraway, Isabel Stengers, Jane bennett, and Karen barad, though younger scholars
such as maria Puig de la bellacasa, Petra Hroch, and Natasha myers belong in this list
as well). to my mind, the “new” is meant simply to distinguish this work from the
work of historical materialism, as it is traditionally conceived. A feminist new materi-
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alist perspective notes the clear and often determinist relationship between subject
and object in the historical materialist view; in a new materialist context, attention to
material speciﬁcity opens onto dense webs of interconnectivity in which the relations
between body, space, and psyche are never a priori determinable. Instead, we ﬁnd our-
selves in the realm of what donna Haraway (1991) refers to as the material-semiotic—
a non-reductive enmeshment of modes, such as practice and theory, mind and body,
private and public, that we are often trained to think of as separate. rather than any
neat progressivist ﬁguration of the “new,” what is intended by the preﬁx is an aware-
ness of objects and things, disciplines and practices, as operating always already in re-
lation; not as “out there,” waiting to be interpreted, rehearsed, and transmitted, but
as elements in a constitutive dance of which we are a part.
this perspective invites us to build on post-structuralism’s discursive insights, while
attending to the speciﬁcity of lived encounters, visibilities, and materialities; it invites
a renewed, nuanced attention to some of feminism’s core concerns, particularly the
challenging of binaries (i.e., binary logics, oppositional thinking), intersectionality (i.e.,
the terrain of human differences), and the role of the personal (i.e., the located, autobi-
ographical, and situated).10 In the context of the Fine Arts Phd, it works to remake ques-
tions surrounding artistic knowledge production, the shifting university landscape, and
the political implications of both, suggesting a mode of interdisciplinarity that crosses
practice/theory lines, not to instrumentalize one for the other, but rather to acknowl-
edge the politics of asserting theory in practice and practice in theory, without collapsing
one into the other. I understand this reworking of the relation of theory to practice as
the strongly feminist and materialist underpinnings of both my doctoral labour and
the pedagogy of doctoral level practice/theory programs more broadly.
Participatory dissent 
during the fourth year of my doctoral work, I stumbled upon an exhibition and panel
organized by dutch philosopher and curator Henk Slager at New york’s apexart gallery
(december 2009).11 under the heading Nameless Science, seven Fine Arts Phd candi-
dates exhibited a variety of Phd projects in progress, paired with a panel event at the
cooper union School of Art on the theme of “the Signiﬁcance of Artistic research for
Art education.” most interesting to me during the panel was the insistence, across the
board, on the value and challenge of the practice-led Phd as a dynamic and individu-
alized program of study, in which assessment parameters would need to be reconﬁg-
ured for each project, despite the potential bureaucratic nightmare. this corresponded
with the exhibition’s title, which derived from Giorgio Agamben’s 1975 essay “Aby war-
burg and the Nameless Science” (later reprinted in his 1999 Potentialities), and refers
to a practice whose rules cannot be known in advance. Accordingly, at stake in the
overall event was a re-conﬁguration of the modes of creative intellectual practice com-
monly called theory-, criticism- and history-making. these processes work in different
ways within different disciplinary spaces, to be sure; yet, there is something of the
cathected investment traditionally associated with the arts to which this event brought
attention. It did this in service of an ethics of knowledge production that might re-
model the academy as a location of care and curiosity, and that insists that we learn to
work with multiple modes of difference.
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on my reading, the exhibition asked that we see the Fine Arts Phd not as an in-
stitutional gesture that equates artistic knowledge production with normative univer-
sity research practices, but rather as one that obliges us to ask how we understand
that labour we call “research” in the ﬁrst place, wherever it is done. true research, it
suggested, must be understood as an embedded entanglement that reconﬁgures all
participants in unexpected ways. As an invitation to rethink the stakes of the political
as well as the social, this approach to research pays attention to non-reproductive, or
queer, models of engagement that impact not only theories of participation and col-
laboration in the arts, but also pedagogical and disciplinary debates within the human-
ities and social sciences.12 these debates centre on conﬂicting understandings of art’s
political possibility, as well as conﬂicting understandings of what it might mean to
think pedagogically. they necessitate a mode of research in which the question
emerges responsively from the encounter; an encounter that, at its most fruitful, is
characterized by what Anna tsing (2005) calls “friction.”
Friction, in tsing’s (2005) idiom, refers to a “zone of awkward engagement” (p. xi)
and champions the “unequal, unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection across
difference” (p. 4). tsing’s conceptualization is both extremely poetic and generative
for thinking through Fine Arts Phd practice, in which matters of expertise, assessment
parameters, and fundamental literacies are necessarily called into question. In what
follows, and to conclude, I propose friction as a mode of thinking across and with dif-
ference, pairing it with feminist political theorist chantal mouffe’s (2005; 2006) con-
ception of an “agonistic” social order. Agonism in mouffe refers to an affectively
grounded conﬂict of elements both internal to, and between, subjects. Agonism not
only speaks to irreconcilable differences between people, disciplines, and practices,
but also insists that such differences lie within them as well. In so doing, it draws on
the role of psychical conﬂict in psychoanalysis.
It is agonism’s psychoanalytic basis in the conception of working through that
readings such as claire bishop’s or Grant Kester’s fail to address adequately (bishop,
2004; wilson, 2007). these readings take mouffe to task for her focus on the antago-
nistic dimension of social interaction. However, while mouffe’s understanding of the
political is inextricably bound to the possibility of antagonism, in a pluralistic democ-
racy it is crucial that this antagonism be worked through. the psychoanalytical process
of working through, for mouffe, transforms the Habermasian “friend/enemy” relation
into a contingent hegemonic formation; that is, into a “we/they” that respectfully ac-
knowledges the rights and positions of others and recognizes the centrality of dissent
(both inter- and intra-subjectively) as an ever-present possibility (Habermas, 1984;
mouffe, 2005). In other words, while a “friend/enemy” relationship works “against”
or “beyond,” a “we/they” relationship works “through” and “with” in a way that, as
donna Haraway (2010) would put it, “stays with the trouble.”
of key importance here is staying with the trouble of disciplinary, affective, and
structural differences, allowing for their friction. this, I argue, is one of the central pos-
sibilities of the Fine Arts Phd and similar institutional locations. respectful dissent
piques my curiosity, as do models of democratic order predicated on conﬂicting values
and opinions. As mouffe (2007) remarks, “in a democratic polity, conﬂicts and con-
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frontations, far from being a sign of imperfection, indicate that democracy is alive and
inhabited by pluralism” (p. 14). this pluralism creates a contact zone, a space that wel-
comes asymmetrical power relations in the exploration of timeplace speciﬁcity, tangi-
bility, and embodied practice.13
I am fundamentally interested in the daily labour and daily play of makingthinking
practices, whatever the form, whether social, political, electronic, sculpted, painted,
performed, or imagined. what matters is our willingness to engage the multiple ways
in which this “making” is a fundamentally situated, relational construct; one that en-
tangles us in relations of debt in ways for which we can never account, despite always
being willing to be accountable. this accountability is one that emerges not only at
the level of disciplinary transversality, but also at the level of an agonistic personal
practice open to friction. working and weaving together the lines between not only
disciplinary factions and political ideologies, but also between thinking and making,
art and life, the personal and the political, the Fine Arts Phd, rather than crossing pu-
tative practice/theory lines, fundamentally reconﬁgures them in a profoundly feminist
way, challenging the myth that the daily practices called “research,” “theory,” “acade-
mic,” and “intellectual” labour are the reiﬁed other to the “embedded,” “instinctive,”
“messy,” “creative” labour of the artist. 
the work that I do in the studio called my ofﬁce, while different in task and form,
is no less messy, or mindful, than the work I do in the ofﬁce I call a studio. the affective
engagement, or trance, that I can inhabit when engaging in “artmaking” is not dis-
similar to the trance that can grab hold of me when writing. this is not to make facile
equivalences, but rather to resist facile accounts of the lived materiality of these prac-
tices, and, through this, to bring a political and ethical mode of attention to them
(mouffe 2005, 2006, 2007; Lacan 1997, 2008).
Practice and research are messy and entangled. they are both deeply creative prac-
tices that emerge as a kind of thinking that can take many forms. drawing, for example,
can be thought of as a mode of knowledge production based on observation, classiﬁ-
cation, attention to the irreducible speciﬁcity of each object or fold in the ﬁeld of vision,
and translation into a representational or non-representational marking system. At-
tention to the context-speciﬁc, to the irreducibly individual, occurs within and at once
with what systematizes and classiﬁes. that is, attention to the individual occurs in the
context of translatability, shared language, and the ability to recognize.
In this, I am particularly interested in the drive to know what we don’t know we
are driven to know; that is, the drive to map and capture, to know in context, as well
as to know in speciﬁcity. this interest drives much of my writing, performance, and
dialogic installation practices. that said, the aim in thinking art-as-research is not to
submit to an instrumentalizing drive in which a dialectic of total knowledge can and
will emerge if, for example, we only gather enough data; although, at a certain level
this is probably an inescapable utopian desire. Instead, if we take the etymology of “re-
search” seriously—to circle again and again—we are led to think about what it means
to link the designation “doctor of Philosophy” to the stakes of the “competent re-
searcher.” Philosophy, after all, articulates the love (Philos) of wisdom (Sophia), which,
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if we follow the latter etymologically, invokes a mind (“wit”) that is always already a
deeply embodied ﬁguration.14
I’d like to assert, then, that at stake in the call for speaking across and with un-
comfortable differences is not only a shift of analysis from the disciplinarily indigenous
object or product as pedagogical aim; rather, also at stake are the time, labour, and
risk of disciplinary and theoretical difference as a practice of always opening oneself
up as the one who does not know. the one who does not ﬁt. the one whose grammar
is denied. It is in the care and curiosity of that risk that I see the most interesting fem-
inist possibilities emerging from this institutional crossroads in the academy.
the question—how do we understand the context we are embedded in as we are
embedded in it?—is both a reﬂexive and diffractive exercise that, if nothing else, leads
us on a cat’s cradle journey through how to think about understanding and re-under-
standing what matters to us, where, when, and how. It is a question that brings us
back, though not full circle, to the stakes of the Gallop (2002) quotation with which I
began, and to a feminist new materialist sensibility conceived more broadly. It is a
question that demands that we craft renewed ways of dealing with the practice/theory
relations we inherit; of reconﬁguring them not as either/or oppositions but as a set of
complex relations that require us to ask ourselves how we understand our ecologies
of practice, how we do our politics, our theory, our “artmaking.” this is what I hope
for as we work at conﬁguring these new institutional spaces in the academy.
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Notes
1. the voices to which I am indebted are too numerous to name. that said, here I am drawing in par-
ticular on Joan Scott’s germinal essay, “the evidence of experience” (1991), chela Sandoval’s work
with differentiated/oppositional consciousness in “methodology of the oppressed” (2000), and rosi
braidotti’s call for a nomadic feminism (1994, 2001, 2006).  my use of “diffraction” draws on the work
of donna Haraway (1992) and Karen barad (2007).
2. while such a reworking of Gallop’s sentence helps me reﬁne my stakes, I hasten to add that these
stakes are very much in line with Gallop’s overall project. on the distinction between anecdote and au-
tobiography, and for an extended engagement with Gallop’s work on anecdotal theory, see Loveless (2011).
3. on the transversal and its importance for feminist new materialism, see van der tuin and dolphijn (2010).
4. “working through” is a psychoanalytic concept that refers to the working through of resistances.
the practice of working through, as Freud formulates it in his 1914 “remembering, repeating and
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working through,” allows the subject to accept repressed elements and loosen the grip of the repetition
compulsion. Important here is that repression is not overcome once the resistance of the ego has been
overcome. Instead, unconscious resistance, that which emerges in the repetition compulsion, has to
be addressed by working through and with, not against or beyond. to work through something is not to
get rid of it but to reconﬁgure one’s relation to it, and it is in this context that I marshal the concept.
5. on the digital humanities and electronic literacies as thought sculptures, see feminist digital theorist
caitlin Fisher (NALd, 2002). I also direct the reader to a more recent piece of Fisher’s that discusses
the way her digital dissertation worked to undo inherited practice-theory relations, the transcript of
which is available at HAStAc, (2007). See also “the Institute for the Future of the book” (n.d.).
6. It is important to remember that these disciplinary concerns emerge equally around the written
word—as Stephen watson reminds us, “a listener at merleau-Ponty’s 1946 defense before the Société
Francaise de Philosophie responded, derogatorily, that ‘this philosophy results in a novel’” (watson,
2008, p. 127). on this topic see brad buckley and John conomos’ “rethinking the contemporary Art
School: the Artist, the Phd and the Academy” (2009), and Steven Henry madoff’s “Art School (Propo-
sitions for the 21st century)” (2009).
7. George Smith (2010) speaks to this point by tracing a history of philosophical debate surrounding
the relation of artistic praxis to epistemology, suggesting that: were it to get us ﬁnally out from under
the dialectics of knowledge and aesthetics, the philosophical education of the artist would necessarily
entail the philosophy of history, but also the study of history per se: 
the history of art, yes; but as importantly, the history of ideas, the history of science, and the
geopolitical history of the State, as these histories mix with the history of art. might we then
expect philosophy to tumble from its rigged position at the top of epistemology?—that Aris-
totle’s phallo-perpendicular, pseudo-dialectical hierarchy of knowledge would at last give way
to rhizomatic and dialogical relations among history, art, and philosophy? … that the philoso-
pher knows and the artist makes is one rule of specialization on its way out. (p. 3)
8. I give “agency” here to the exploration not to anthropomorphize it, but rather to suggest the em-
bedded and tangled process of coming into, working through, dancing with, being formed by and
forming something out of a set of curiosities and cares, whether it be a book, a seminar, a laboratory
experiment, a public intervention, conference, installation, performance, or gallery piece.
9. my dissertation, Acts of Pedagogy: Feminism, Psychoanalysis, Art and ethics (Loveless, 2010), argues
that how we do our pedagogical thinking and how we live our social and political lives are powerfully
intertwined: pedagogy is a political act, and changing how we do pedagogy impacts the ethics of all
social practices, including research and scholarship. central to my dissertation is the argument that
pedagogy is not the simple activity of (self-transparent) subjects thinking together in the classroom.
It is, instead, the event of being visited by something other, something unexpected, messy, improper,
queer. Accordingly, I deliberately structure a different rhetorical voice and archive for each of the dis-
sertation’s chapters. these voices resonate with and across each other, each mobilizing different ped-
agogical ﬁgures: (1) the feminist theorist and teacher, (2) the visual cultural theorist, (3) the
ethnographic researcher, (4) the literary theorist/textual close reader, and (5) the artist-theorist.
through this genre-play I ask how we can be attentive to irreconcileable difference in productive ways,
the kinds of differences that come from working across the arts, humanities, sciences, and social sci-
ences. I do this in order to build towards a theory of “participatory dissent” as a practice of speaking
across and with affective and disciplinary difference.
10. In challenging and reconﬁguring inherited binaries, new materialist feminism works to produce
us as “of the world” and not “in the world,” thereby calling us into a different mode of accountability
and responsibility that is fundamentally ecological. I distinguish ecological thinking here from envi-
ronmentalism; on this distinction see (miles 2005; morton 2007, 2010).
11. the panel brought together ucSd professor Grant Kester, mick wilson, dean of the Graduate School
of creative Arts and media, in dublin, Ireland, and George Smith, founder of the ﬁrst Phd program in
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philosophy for artists at the Institute for doctoral Studies in Visual Art. the full text of this panel
(Kester, Smith, & wilson, 2009) is available in Art and Research.
12. Importantly, here, the alternative to reproductive logic is not a barren one (see Sedgewick 1991; de
Lauretis 1991; edelman 2004; Ahmed 2006; Hoogland 2007; munoz 2009).  rather, it is the insatiably
curious that marks a queer queerness. the insatiably and impossibly curious is what disrupts any and
all normative reproductive models of engagement, and it is this mode of being driven by our cathected
curiosities that both characterizes pedagogical thinking and a pedagogical ethics (Loveless, 2010).
drawing on Lacan’s “the ethics of Psychoanalysis” (1997), it is precisely the impossibility of prescribing
an ethical program that is at stake; rather than decided upon in advance, an ethics emerges as one’s
animating force.
13. I borrow the term contact zone from James clifford (1997), who, in turn, borrows it from mary
Louise Pratt (1991). 
14. In “metamorphoses,” braidotti (2001) distinguishes ﬁgurations in the following way: “Figurations
are not ﬁgurative ways of thinking, but rather more materialistic mappings of situated, or embedded
and embodied, position” (p. 2).
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